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A firm intention announcement must be made when the
offeror is able and willing to acquire securities, and when a
mandatory offer must be made. When the firm intention
announcement is implemented, some sort of a contract is
created. This rule has helped to determine the particular
time the offeror should be liable to minorities. The question
of when the offeror should bear the obligation to implement
mandatory offers in aborted takeovers is thus no more
problematic. Previously, the courts wrestled with this issue,
but delivered what appears to be unsatisfactory decisions.
This article will discuss the effect of a firm intention
announcement and the responsibility that attends the mak-
ing of that announcement. It intends to illustrate the extent
of liability the offeror must bear in the event of a lapsed
takeover, before and after the making of the firm intention
announcement. The article examines the manner in which
takeover rules can be enforced, and whether the current
measures afford minorities proper protection. This brings to
light the issue of equal treatment in takeovers and the falla-
cy thereof. A minor appraisal of the takeover rules in two
jurisdictions in Europe (the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands) is conducted to assess how equal treatment for
minorities is promoted. Due to the difficulty minorities may
experience in enforcing equal treatment in company take-
overs, the article advocates for the alteration of the current
South African takeover procedure for the promotion of
minorities’ interests and for establishing rules that provide
the offeror adequate information.
Keywords: company takeovers, mandatory offers, minority
shareholders, equal treatment, acquisition procedure
1 Introduction
Under South African law, a mandatory offer must be
implemented when an offeror obtains a beneficial
interest equal to or above the prescribed percentage in
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any voting securities of a regulated company.1 The
obtained beneficial interest must be at least 35% or
more of the voting securities. Such acquisition of securi-
ties must result in an affected transaction.2 This kind of
affected transaction compels the offeror to make an offer
for minority securities on the same terms as the
obtained securities or soon to be obtained securities.3
Thus, the offeror must follow procedures that lead to
compliance with the takeover rules; these procedures are
meant to support the regime of mandatory offers,
particularly to ensure equal treatment of all security
holders. The procedures inherently encourage devotion
to the rules that shield affected security holders in take-
over bids.4
In practising general caution when acquiring securities,
the offeror must ensure that the information it proposes
to disclose is correct and reliable.5 To secure the credi-
bility of the marketplace,6 the fundamental transactions
and takeover regulations comprise announcement rules
that guarantee the preservation of delicate information.7
Consequently, when a mandatory offer has to be made
to minorities, the offeror must make a firm intention
announcement.8 An offer, which must be made before
the firm intention announcement, cannot be retracted
after the announcement, even before acceptance of the
1. Section 118(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008: (a) a public company;
a state-owned company, except to the extent that any such company
has been exempt; and specific private companies. Further see rule 81
(o) of the Companies Regulations of 2011.
2. Section 117(1)(c) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008: (i) a transaction or
series of transactions amounting to the disposal of all or the greater part
of the assets or undertaking of a regulated company; (ii) an amalgama-
tion or merger involving at least one regulated company; (iii) a scheme
of arrangement between a regulated company and its shareholders; (iv)
transactions in terms of Section 122, see note 30; (v) the announced
intention to acquire a beneficial interest in the remaining voting securi-
ties of a regulated company not already held by a person or persons
acting in concert; (vi) a mandatory offer and (vii) compulsory acquisi-
tion.
3. Rule 111(3) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Section 123(3)(b) and
Companies Regulations of 2011.
4. See Section 127 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and rule 98 of the
Companies Regulations of 2011: where certain omission or breach of
the takeover protocol will result in a prohibited dealing.
5. See rule 111(8) of the Companies Regulations of 2011.
6. Section 119(1)(a); (b) and (c) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.
7. Rule 100 and rule 101 of the Companies Regulations of 2011.
8. Rule 101(1) of the Companies Regulations of 2011.
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offer. Therefore, the offeror is statutorily bound to
perform when called upon to do so, or else, a legal suit
may ensue.9
It appears that a firm intention announcement creates
some genus of a contract among the offerors and offer-
ees.10 This, of course, is an imperfect contract, as its
perfection hinges on acceptance of the offer. It stands to
reason that a quasi-contract11 is formed between the
offeror and the offerees when a firm intention
announcement is made.12 When a firm intention
announcement is made, the offerees are thereupon gran-
ted the right to recourse if the offeror fails to follow
takeover rules.
Despite the implementation of a firm intention
announcement, the proposed takeover may not material-
ise.13 Upon breach of takeover rules, it must be deter-
mined who should carry the liability for the ensuing los-
ses. If the offeror is culpable, the offeror should endure
the burden of compensating the affected security hold-
ers for the damage it has caused.14 Conversely, who
should bear liability where the offeree is liable for a
failed bid? For instance, when the offeree fails to adhere
to the terms of the agreement at an advanced stage of
the acquisition. Where the offeror withdraws from the
negotiations before a firm intention announcement is
made, the situation is not problematic, as contractual
liability does not arise.15 The problem occurs where the
firm intention announcement has been made. This arti-
cle will illustrate that a firm intention announcement
qualifies minorities to seek recourse for the damage suf-
fered. Through implementing a firm intention
announcement, the offeror agrees to contract with the
offerees, provided all the requirements of the offer are
met. The requirements, however, must not be based on
a subjective condition that limit the making of a
mandatory offer.16 This quasi-contract binds the offeror
even before the offerees accept the offer.17
The article intends to probe this regime of takeovers
mainly to limit possible confusion with respect to the
liability that must flow in aborted takeovers; it fathoms
the extent of liability the offeror should assume upon
breach of the takeover rules and tests the theory of equal
treatment in takeovers. It intends to illustrate that the
value of offers should be clearer in takeovers bids and
9. This position was adopted to address the difficulties encountered in the
Haslam v. Sefalana Employee Benefits Organisation [1997] 4 All SA
269 (W) case.
10. Rule 94, rule 101(3) and rule 101 (7) of the Companies Regulations of
2011: Negotiations referred to in the regulations implies to contractual
negotiation, and similarly offer means contractual offer to purchase
securities.
11. The author uses the word quasi-contract to illustrate that there is no full
contract but a contract that binds one party only (the offeror), in cases
where the other party (the offeree) would have accepted the offer.
12. Rule 101(1) and (2) of the Companies Regulations of 2011.
13. Rule 111(5) of the Companies Regulations of 2011.
14. Benson v. SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A).
15. Rule 94(2) of the Companies Regulations of 2011.
16. The offeror may thus set a condition on the expiry of the offer or the
minimum number of securities required in offer; see rule 81(d) and rule
101(7)(v) and (viii) of the Companies Regulations of 2011.
17. Rule 96 and rule 101(2) of the Companies Regulations of 2011.
that offers must be submitted concurrently to all
security holders to ensure equal treatment. Moreover, a
synopsis of the takeover regimes in the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom is provided to determine whether
the rules that promote equal treatment during takeover
bids in these jurisdictions deliver adequate protection to
minorities.
2 Mandatory Offers
It is judicious to first probe the rules contained in the
mandatory offer regime. The mandatory offer rules have
developed over the years.18 Even so, most of the take-
over rules contained in Securities Regulation Code on
Takeovers and Mergers (the Code), and which triggered
mandatory offers, still apply today. Thus, a mandatory
offer has to be made where the offeror/s acting alone or
in concert19 acquire securities of a regulated company
equalling or above the prescribed percentage.20 In
essence, the offeror/s have to gain a beneficial interest
equal to or above the prescribed percentage (resulting in
an affected transaction) before the offeror/s could be
bound to make offers for minority securities.21 A
mandatory offer is triggered by the transfer of the pre-
scribed percentage (or rather the control) from the
offeree/s to the offeror/s in an affected transaction.22
The word control is not included in the takeover rules
under Companies Act 71, but it still has a significant
bearing on when a mandatory offer should be made.23
The gaining of control should lead to all relevant
security holders receiving equal treatment. The
mandatory offer rule is particularly intended to ensure
fair and equal treatment of all holders of relevant securi-
ties when the transference of company control is in the
offing.24 It is submitted that minorities could be treated
unfairly during takeovers, and ill treatment can last well
past the takeover period.25
It is explicit that this takeover regime is intended to
shield minority security holders, of companies that are
18. Contrast Chapter XVA of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, Securities
Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers with Section 123 of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008 and chap 5 of the Companies Regulations of
2011. Whereas, this regime of takeovers has transformed from the
Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the Code) for-
mat, in general the regime only experienced minor alterations.
19. See Section 117(1)(b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.
20. Section 123 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and F.H.I. Cassim (ed.),
Contemporary Company Law, 2nd ed., Cape Town: Juta (2012) Section
15.5.9.
21. Companies Regulations of 2011: rule 96.
22. See P. Nkoane, ‘Is There a Need for Mandatory Offers in Company
Takeover: A Critical Analysis?’, 36 Obiter 363, at 366-70 (2015).
23. Ibid., at 367-9. While it was a careful decision to jettison the theory of
control from the ambit of mandatory offers in the Companies Act 71,
the term control appears to still underpin this regime. A proper reading
of the Companies Regulations will confirm that the triggering of a
mandatory offer hinges on the change of control of the company.
24. See explanatory notes 1(a) and rule 8.1 of Securities Regulation Code
on Takeovers and Mergers (the Code).
25. Spinnaker Investments (Pty) Ltd v. Tongaat Group Ltd 1982 (1) SA 65
(A), at 72-3.
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destined for a change of control, against abuse and facil-
itate equal treatment in takeovers. It is held that a per-
son or persons who acquire securities in the range of the
prescribed percentage may potentially gain control of
the target company. In brief, the mandatory offer
regime is associated with the theory of ostensible con-
trol, which is founded on the idea that a shareholder can
control the outcome of a company’s resolutions with the
ownership of only 35% of the company’s securities.26
This can occur where the company’s shareholding is
widespread.
Regarding acute cases, it is submitted that the
mandatory offers rule serves the purpose of dispiriting
the so-called corporate looters (generally referred to as
predator, white-collar looter or early-dawn raider) by
forcing them to abandon the booty.27 This is accom-
plished through rules that impose a submission of a sim-
ilar offer for all similar securities.28 This allows all
affected security holders to stake a claim in the premium
paid for securities acquired or soon to be acquired,
accordingly empowering affected security holders of a
company where control has changed to exit the compa-
ny at the best price possible.29
The South African mandatory offers regime is
formulated on experience and the need to protect
minority shareholders. In this respect, the article under-
takes an analysis of the regimes in the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom to determine whether minorities
are adequately protected during takeovers and the
degree of the equal treatment afforded to minorities in
these jurisdictions.
3 The European Directive on
Mandatory Offers and the
Netherlands Regime
The European Union (EU) has continually endeavoured
to bring uniformity in company takeovers across its dif-
ferent Member States through provision of minimum
guidelines on the conduct and transparency of takeover
bids.30 To this end, the EU formulated the Takeover
Directive (2004/25/EC) to harmonise the takeover laws
of different Member States. The Directive does not
26. An account of the theory of ostensible or effective control is satisfactori-
ly provided elsewhere. Thus, one can consult the following works if the
need to canvass the issue arises: J. Stedman, Takeovers. London (1993),
at 16; H.A.J. Ford, R.P. Austin & I.M. Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Cor-
porations Law, 12 ed. (2004), at 1083 and Nkoane (2015), above n.
22.
27. Haslam v. Sefalana Employee Benefits Organisation [1997] 4 All SA
269 (W), 278.
28. See W.D. Andrews, ‘The Stockholders Right of Equal Opportunity in the
Sale of Shares’, 78 Harvard Law Review 505, at 515 (1964); for the
need to treat every shareholder equally.
29. E. Armson, ‘Models for Takeover Dispute Resolution: Australia and the
UK’, 5 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 401, at 412-14 (2005).
30. B. Clarke, ‘European Takeover Regulation-The Latest Draft of the 13th
Company Law Directive’, 11 European Business Law Review 482
(1999).
promote rigid rules, thus affording Members States the
flexibility to adopt their own measures that comply with
the minimum requirements of the Directive.31 Before
the implementation of the Takeover Directive by the
EU Member States, the rules related to the conduct of
takeover offers were quite diverse throughout the EU.
Thus, takeovers could not be commenced with the same
expectation of success in different Member States, and
shareholders did not have the same protection and
opportunities.32 The purpose of having uniform laws
across different Member States of the EU has filtered
down to takeover laws, including mandatory offer rules.
In the event a person, as a result of his own acquisition
or the acquisition by persons acting in concert with him,
reaches a certain percentage of the voting rights in a
company which gives him control of that company, the
EU Member State must ensure that such a person is
required to make a mandatory offer in order to protect
the minority shareholders of that company.33
As mentioned, the rules are flexible and afford Member
States the discretion to determine what constitutes the
gaining of control. The Directive also allows the national
law that provides for adequate protection of the minori-
ty shareholders to create derogations from the
mandatory offer rule.34 This has permitted Member
States to create rules that do not lead to the making of a
mandatory offer in all takeover offers, particularly if the
acquisition does not pose a threat to minorities.35 How-
ever, as a rule under the Directive that allows no diver-
gence, where a mandatory offer must be made, the
offeror must be prepared to acquire all voting securities
of the target company.36 This generally increases the
cost of acquisitions, both friendly and hostile, to a level
that acts as a deterrent to takeover bids altogether.37
This sweeping rule justifies the inclusion of the deroga-
tion rule in the EU Directive to moderate deterrence
that could stem from the enforcement of the mandatory
offer rules, particularly where the gaining of influential
control is not possible or where offers for company
securities would not lead to the practice of unfair treat-
ment.
Similar to what constitutes control, the Member States
can discretionarily formulate their announcement rules.
The announcement rules appear to be hinged on the
need to ensure transparency and integrity of the market
31. T. Papadopoulos, ‘The Mandatory Provisions of the EU Takeover Bid
Directive and Their Deficiencies’, 6 Law and Financial Markets Review
525 (2007).
32. C. Cascante and J. Tyrolt, European Directive Takeover Guide, https://
www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=D999E949-
ED7C-44AE-86B1-2F2E8A36C069 (last visited 28 September 20202).
33. Ibid.
34. Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the EU Directive on Takeovers.
35. L. Enriques, ‘The Mandatory Bid Rule in the Takeover Directive: Harmo-
nization Without Foundation?’, 4 European Company and Financial
Law Review 440, at 443 (2004).
36. C. Clerc, F. Demarigny, D. Valiante & M. de Manuel Aramendía, A
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of the offeree securities during takeovers.38 It then
stands to reason that any announcement protocol must
lead to a transparent market and the protection of the
value of the target company’s securities. This should
also include minority interests. Nevertheless, the EU
Directive does not overtly advocate for the liability that
should ensue after the announcement for takeovers has
been made, particularly measures that empower minori-
ties to seek compensation. This obligation is consigned
to national lawmakers of the different Member States.
Different Member States may opt for different
announcement rules, some States may adopt announce-
ment rules that exert an obligation on the offeror. The
Member States may equally formulate the degree of lia-
bility that should stem from the breach of the takeover
rules. Whether this should be an adequate formula that
affords the minorities equal treatment in company take-
overs leads to a debate.
3.1 Mandatory Offers in the Netherlands
Historically, legal commentary on takeover laws has not
been in short supply in the Netherlands.39 The Nether-
lands, just like many other jurisdictions, has experi-
enced a progression in its takeover laws, from central-
ised domestic laws to the adoption of laws that are in
harmony with similar regional laws. The Netherlands,
as part of the EU, adopted the EU Directive to harmo-
nise its takeover laws,40 of course, with the retention of
some distinctiveness. The Netherlands’ regime contains
some rules that are identical to the rules of South Africa
and the United Kingdom; however, there are also
noticeable divergences. This article seeks to evaluate the
protection afforded to minorities during takeover bids,
particularly when a mandatory offer must be made, and
the machinery minority security holders may invoke to
enforce equal treatment. It assesses the contractual
implications of the gaining of control of a regulated
company and the rules that are aimed at protecting
security holders.
The gaining of controlling influence triggers a
mandatory offer rule in the Dutch law. The controlling
influence is considered to have occurred when the offer-
or is able to exercise 30% or more of the voting rights in
the general meeting of shareholders of a regulated com-
pany.41 This includes offerors that are acting in concert
38. D. Van Gerven, ‘Rules of Community Law Applicable to Takeover Bids’,
in D. Van Gerven (ed.), Common Legal Framework for Takeover Bids in
Europe, Vol. 1 (2008) 1, at 26.
39. B.J.H. Crans, ‘Netherlands’, 19 International Business & Law 262
(1991); C. Vellekoop, ‘Hostile Takeovers in the Netherlands’, 7 Inter-
national Financial Law Review 11 (1988); C. Huiskes, ‘Dutch Proposal
to Restrict Anti-Takeover Devices’, 17 International Financial Law
Review 29 (1998); J.D. Kleyn, ‘Keeping Control in the Netherlands’, 9
International Financial Law Review 10 (1990) and D. Quinn, ‘Dutch
Treat: Netherlands Judiciary only Goes Halfway towards Adopting Dela-
ware Trilogy in Takeover Context’, 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transna-
tional Law 1211 (2008).
40. J. Cremers and R. H. van Het Kaar, ‘Implementation of the Takeover
Bids Directive in the Netherlands’ in J. Cremers, and S. Vitols (Eds)
Takeovers With or Without Worker Voice: Workers’ Rights Under the
EU Takeover Bids Directive (2016) 181-93.
41. P. Corten (ed), Public Takeover Bids in the Benelux. Loyens & Loeff
(2011), at 69.
with each other.42 Those acting in concert or acting
alone must observe takeover rules; they must exercise
general caution when tendering to acquire control of the
target company. Any price-sensitive information must
be kept confidential during the takeover process; how-
ever, if such information is leaked, an advisory
announcement should immediately be made to protect
the value of the offeree securities. Failure to make the
announcement may culminate in administrative sanc-
tions or shareholders instituting claims for damages
against the target company and/or the offeror.43 This
rule limits reckless conduct and provides security hold-
ers clear remedies during takeovers.
A compulsory announcement must be made when the
offeror and the board of the offeree company have
reached an agreement or a ‘conditional agreement’ about
an offer.44 The making of an offer to acquire regulated
securities in the Netherlands system differs from those
in the South African and the British systems. The mak-
ing of an offer for company securities, unlike in the
South African system, does not in itself create a con-
tract, quasi or not. However, to discourage uncontrolled
conduct during the bidding process, there is a ‘put up or
shut up’ rule that the target company may invoke to
impose disclosure obligations on a potential offeror if
the offeror has publicly announced its intention to
acquire securities.45 This rule should be seen as a
machinery to protect the target company’s securities
from possible market flux.46 Once the announcement to
acquire securities that trigger a mandatory offer rule has
been made, the offeror may not simply withdraw its
offer.47 This rule serves the same purpose as the South
African firm intention announcement rule. The differ-
ence is that the offeror may only make the announce-
ment when the conditional agreement has been reached
regarding the offer and acceptance, and the possible cost
involved.48 In South African jurisprudence, the offer to
acquire securities must not be founded on subjective
conditions.49 The use of the word conditional in the
Dutch law leads to the impression that the whole agree-
ment is hinged on a circumstance. This is so, because in
practice, most bids are made conditional subject to
approval by the Dutch Financial Markets Authority. It
is quite clear that the word condition may relate to the
acceptance of the offer or any other condition that may
relate to the offer. This is more acute when the offeror
disputes the obligation to make a mandatory offer. In
this respect, one wonders whether the announcement
could be regarded as advantageous to minorities due to
the whole agreement being subject to the approval of the
relevant authority.
42. Ibid.
43. S.C. Pessani et al., Guide to Public Takeovers in Europe (2016), at 146.
44. Article 2:359b of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code.
45. Pessani et al., above n. 43, at 245.
46. Ibid., at 244.
47. Ibid., at 203.
48. Ibid., at 244.
49. See note 16 above.
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When interpreted accurately, the ‘put up or shut up’
rule is not framed to necessarily focus on or encompass
mandatory offers. The minorities are always on the out-
side, looking in, particularly when a mandatory offer is a
secondary offer. Distinct to the South African firm
intention announcement rule, the ‘put up or shut up’
rule does not create an obligation on the offeror towards
minorities. Upon the offeror failing to make a
mandatory offer, the minorities may only enforce the
same through filing a request with the Enterprise
Chamber as the Dutch Financial Markets Authority
lacks authority to enforce mandatory offers.50 Remedies
that are available to minorities largely affect the offeror’s
rights to and interests in the acquired securities, and do
not provide minorities contractual rights. The Enter-
prise Chamber may take steps, at the minorities’
request, which may include suspending the voting
rights of the prospective offeror in the target company,
ordering the decrease of its shareholding or suspending
or nullifying any resolutions that may have been
adopted during the general meeting of shareholders
after the duty to make a mandatory bid arose.51
It is overt that the regime lacks clear machinery that
functions to elucidate the liability of the offeror towards
minorities when a mandatory offer is disputed, thus
simply relegating minorities to the marginal limits of
equal treatment. The minorities, on their own accord,
should organise and launch a legal challenge with the
Enterprise Chamber if they are unfairly treated.
Whether this regime promotes equal treatment of all
shareholders in takeovers is an issue that is quite moot,
but conventional wisdom has it that there is inequality
in the practice of equal treatment.
4 The United Kingdom’s
Mandatory Offer Procedure
In the United Kingdom, supervision of the trading of
companies’ securities has long been considered a neces-
sity in controlling the conduct of security traders. This
is similarly essential in the context of one of the more
public fields of market activity – the corporate takeover
or merger.52 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers
(the Code) is formulated to administer company take-
overs and mergers. Initially, the Code was a mere direc-
tory and not an enforceable law.53 The Code has since
been turned into a binding law.54 The Code is designed
mainly to ensure that shareholders in an offeree compa-
ny are treated fairly and are not denied an opportunity
50. Pessani et al., above n. 43, at 35.
51. Pessani et al., above n. 43, at 35.
52. B.J. Davies, ‘An Affair of the City: A Case Study in the Regulation of
Take-overs and Mergers’, 36 Modern Law Review 457 (1973).
53. T. Shea, ‘Regulation of Takeovers in the United Kingdom’, 16 Brooklyn
Journal of International Law 89, at 90 (1990).
54. Section 10(d) of The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (2016) (the
Code).
to decide on the merit of a takeover bid.55 In this
respect, shareholders in the offeree company of the same
class must be afforded the same treatment by the offer-
or/s.56 The Code is developed to reflect the appropriate
business standards and how fairness to offeree company
shareholders can be achieved.57 The mandatory offers
regime was created to promote equality and to protect
minorities in takeovers. When any person acquires an
interest in shares that carry 30 percentage or more of the
voting rights of a company, a mandatory offer must be
extended to minorities. Similarly, any person, together
with persons acting in concert with him, who is interes-
ted in shares which taken together carry not less than
30% of the voting rights of a company, but no more
than 50% of the voting rights, must make mandatory
offers to minorities.58
In all regulated security purchases, the offeror/s must
approach the board of the offeree company first. After
the offeror has approached the board for the purpose of
acquiring securities, the rules command that an
announcement must be made when a firm intention to
make an offer is reported to the board by the offeror or
on behalf of an offeror, irrespective of the attitude of the
board to the offer.59 Similarly, an announcement must
be made immediately upon acquisition of any interest in
shares that gives rise to an obligation to make mandatory
offers.60 An offeror (or its advisers) must report a firm
intention to make an offer in the first instance to the
board of the offeree company (or its advisers). Subse-
quent to having been approached, the offeree company
is responsible for making any announcement required
under the mandatory offers rule.61 Similarly, the Panel
must be consulted in advance, prior to the announce-
ment of a firm intention to make an offer.62 Offers can
also be made under the condition that the statements
pronounced, mainly regarding the price of a possible
offer and the terms of the offer, do not bind the offer-
or.63 Owing to this provision, one wonders whether the
announcement should be regarded as a firm intention to
acquire securities.
Even after the offeror commits to acquire securities, the
offeror is permitted to withdraw its offer.64 This allows
the offeror the scope to analyse and decide whether to
continue or abandon the acquisition of securities if a
mandatory offer is triggered. This is more relevant after
the offeror becomes aware of the number of shares that
would be issued.65 The offeror can then decide to con-
tinue with or withdraw the offer. The offeror would
55. F. Ipekel, ‘Operation of the Equality Principle in the UK City Code on
Takeovers and Mergers’, Yearbook of International Financial and
Economic Law 425 (2000-2001).
56. Section 2(a) of the Code.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Rule 2.2 (a) of the Code.
60. Rule 2.2 (b) of the Code.
61. Rule 2.3 (c) of the Code.
62. Rule 2.5 (a) of the Code.
63. Rule 2.5 (a)(i) and (ii) of the Code.
64. Rule 2.10 (c) of the Code.
65. Rule 2.9 of the Code.
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proceed to acquire securities with full knowledge of the
number of securities that are tendered for sale and the
costs involved. Thus, mandatory offers may not repre-
sent a surprise transaction to the offeror, and if the cost
of a mandatory offer is beyond the offeror, the offeror
may not proceed with the offer. In contrast to the South
African regime, the firm intention announcement in the
United Kingdom does not bind the offeror to an uncon-
ditional commitment to the offerees.66
The withdrawal of an offer after the publication of the
firm intention to purchase could lead to a possible mar-
ket flux. The withdrawal may (may not) stem from the
pressure to make a mandatory offer. This then raises the
question of whether takeovers afford minorities equal
treatment. The value of the securities of the affected
company could be adversely affected by the news that
the investors have abandoned a bid to takeover a compa-
ny. Speculation may further fuel the flux. Ensuing spec-
ulations could lead to the share price of the company
falling. The South African takeover regime is construc-
ted to prevent this sort of reaction, and if this sort of
drop could not be avoided, the offeror should bear lia-
bility for any damage caused by its termination of the
offer after a firm intention announcement has been pub-
lished. This is the premise of the firm intention
announcement ideology in the South African regime.
The firm intention announcement regime in South
Africa also affords minorities the right to approach the
courts for recourse for breach of contract as if they have
contracted with the offeror.
Under the United Kingdom’s law, failure to make or
fulfil a mandatory offer does not render the initial trans-
action void or unenforceable or affect its validity.67 The
minority security holders may approach the Panel if the
offeror fails to make a mandatory offer; in turn, the Pan-
el may approach the court to have the offeror comply
with the mandatory offers rule.68 The court may make a
ruling it considers to be just, including awarding
damages or ordering that the offeror procure the minor-
ity securities.69 It is clear that the awarding of damages
does not equate to equal treatment in the true meaning
of the word, even though the court could regard it as a
fitting remedy. Thus, when majority securities are
acquired at a premium and the minorities are awarded
damages in the form of the paid premium, equal treat-
ment does not occur.
66. Note 2 of notes on rule 2.7 of the Code.
67. Rule 10 of the Code.
68. Rule 10(d) of the Code.
69. Section 955 of the Companies Act 2006.
5 The Impact of the Firm
Intention Announcement in
South African Law
Due to the necessity to promote stable markets and the
fulfilment of takeover regulations, procedures must be
observed when offers are made in respect of securities of
regulated companies. The law, therefore, compels offer-
ors to follow takeover protocol when tendering to pro-
cure securities of a regulated company, in cases where
the transaction amounts to an affected transaction.70
The consequence that flows from the making of the firm
intention announcement is distant to the rules of con-
tract law, and it poses obvious difficulties to fully com-
prehend. The author’s opinions on the consequence of
the firm intention announcement are hinged on the
interpretation of the wording of rules 101 (1)-(4) of the
Companies Regulations of 2011. The firm intention
announcement contains an official written offer to pur-
chase securities. This written offer must be submitted to
the independent board, which in turn must refer it to
the offerees through a solicitation campaign. This means
that through publishing the firm intention announce-
ment, the offeree company would have considered the
offeror as binding itself to acquire the offerees’ securi-
ties. The offeree company board would partially accept
the offer on behalf of the offerees to bind the offeror
when it publishes the firm intention announcement, but
the offer would still be subject to the offerees’ approval.
Thereupon, the offeror cannot withdraw its offer with-
out the consent of the offeree company. Hence, it is
emphasised that the offeror must proceed with the offer
after a firm intention announcement is made – the offer-
or is afforded no discretion to act otherwise. Since the
offeree company accepts the offer on statutory grounds
to bind the offeror, the offeree cannot be sued for breach
of contract if it later rejects the offer. Even in cases
where the offeror is sanctioned to make a firm intention
announcement because the independent board has failed
to do so, the same consequences would still follow.
Where the mandatory offer should be made after the
initial acquisition, the making of a firm intention
announcement qualifies minorities to enforce specific
performance as if they contracted with the offeror. This
position was adopted to address the difficulties encoun-
tered in the Haslam v. Sefalana Employee Benefits
Organisation71 case, discussed later in this article.
The offeror has to approach the board of an offeree
company when proposing to acquire securities of a
regulated company.72 Where the board of an offeree
regulated company is approached with a view to acquire
securities, the board may require reasonable evidence
that the offeror is, or will be, in a position to implement
70. See part B & C of chapter 5 of the Companies Regulation 2011.
71. [1997] 4 All SA 269 (W).
72. Rule 99(1) of the Companies Regulation 2011.
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the offer in full.73 Where the offer involves price-sensi-
tive information, a cautionary announcement must be
made.74 There is another declaration that is similarly
central in ensuring that takeover regulations are proper-
ly observed. The making of a firm intention announce-
ment is basic when the transaction triggers a mandatory
offer.75 The responsibility of implementing a firm inten-
tion announcement rests with the independent board of
the offeree regulated company, and if the independent
board of an offeree fails to make the announcement, the
Panel may sanction the offeror to make the announce-
ment.76 It is correct to assume that the announcement
protocols serve a fundamental function in takeovers.
Accordingly, it is prudent to probe how the announce-
ments affect the takeover rules.
5.1 A Case Law Appraisal of the Obligation to
Extend Offers to Minorities
The author intends to tread back to the time when the
announcement regime was not central in takeovers. The
Panel did not necessarily interfere in takeovers when
announcements were not made. Lack of clarity on when
an offeror should bear the obligation to compensate
minorities in failed takeovers caused much trouble. The
courts were at variance on this matter.77
The court in Haslam v. Sefalana Employee Benefits
Organisation78 had to determine whether the offeror who
repudiated the contract to acquire securities in a termi-
nated affected transaction was liable to minorities for
specific performance, even when the offeror did not
make an offer to minorities. The court sought to deter-
mine whether the offeror was legally bound to minori-
ties by assessing what the terms ‘acquisition’ and ‘secur-
ities’ entailed in takeovers. The court first pointed out
that the Code mainly sought to secure adherence to
takeover rules by requiring offerors to engage in nego-
tiations only if they can completely follow the takeover
rules. In this regard, the courts referred to Section 440L
and 440M(4) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, which,
inter alia, stated that
no person shall enter into or propose an affected
transaction except in accordance with the Code, [and]
any person who contravenes any of the rules shall be
liable to any other person for any loss or damage suf-
fered by that person as a result of such contraven-
tion.79
73. Rule 99(3) of the Companies Regulation 2011.
74. Rule 100 of the Companies Regulation 2011.
75. Rule 101(1) of the Companies Regulation 2011.
76. Rule 101(4) of the Companies Regulation 2011.
77. Some may erroneously argue that Haslam v. Sefalana Employee Bene-
fits Organisation [1997] 4 All SA 269 (W) and the appeal case of Sefa-
lana Employee Benefits Organisation v. Haslam 2000 (2) SA 415 (SCA)
are obsolete. The author suggests that, as far as the issue of aborted
takeovers is concerned, these cases still provide an indispensable illus-
tration of the difficulty associated with aborted takeovers.
78. [1997] 4 All SA 269 (W).
79. Haslam v. Sefalana Employee Benefits Organisation [1997] 4 All SA
269 (W), at 273.
The court further stated that in interpreting the defini-
tion of ‘acquisition’ and of ‘securities’, consideration
must be given to the Code’s purport and spirit.80 The
Code’s formulation and application are directed ‘princi-
pally to ensure fair and equal treatment of all holders of
relevant securities in relation to affected transactions’.81
The general principle 1 of the Code emphasises this fact
in the following words: ‘all holders of the same class of
securities of an offeree company shall be treated similar-
ly by an offeror’ when acquiring securities of a regulated
company.82 The court averred that the word ‘acquire’,
when construed widely, denoted/s the right to attain
ownership of ‘securities’. Accordingly, by mere inten-
tion to acquire ownership of securities in a regulated
company and concluding a contract to that effect, the
offeror assents to acquire minority securities.83
The court, further, held that a concluded contract
which is terminated qualifies minorities to seek recourse
if the terminated transaction constituted an affected
transaction. Therefore, minorities are entitled to seek an
order of specific performance or damages for compensa-
tion. This decision found affluent buttress in the aca-
demic circle – it was argued that the decision was accu-
rate.84
The matter was referred to the Supreme Court of
Appeal.85 The court adopted a different view. It held
that ‘[w]hat requires to be appreciated at the outset, is
that shareholders are not ordinarily entitled to equality
of treatment when offers to purchase their shares are
made’.86 It continued, ‘The sole rationale for the exist-
ence of an obligation to make a similar offer to other
shareholders, namely, a transference of control, has fall-
en away prior to the making of an offer to them and
there no longer exists any present prospect of the offeror
acquiring control’.87 The court held that ‘[a]n offeror
who has not completely acquired securities of a compa-
ny would obviously not be entitled to vote as if he, she
or it were a registered shareholder’.88 It concluded that
‘it is of course so that there appears cursorily to be
inequality of treatment but the respective positions of
the litigants virtually remained the same’.89 If an offeror
has contracted unconditionally to purchase shares from
a shareholder, repudiation of the agreement may well
entitle the offeree to damages.90 However, a shareholder
to whom no offer has been extended, let alone accepted,
80. Ibid., at 274.
81. Ibid., at 274.
82. Ibid., at 274.
83. Ibid., at 276-7.
84. See M.P. Larkin and J. Boltar, ‘Company Law (Including Close-Corpora-
tion)’, Annual Survey of South African Law 403, at 415-16 (1997) and
S. Luiz, ‘Mandatory offers’, 12 South African Mercantile Law Journal
382, at 385-8 (2000).
85. See Sefalana Employee Benefits Organisation v. Haslam 2000 (2) SA
415 (SCA).
86. Ibid., Para. 4.
87. Ibid., Para. 7.
88. Ibid., Para. 15.
89. Ibid., Para. 10.
90. Ibid., Para. 10.
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and with whom there is, therefore, no contractual rela-
tion, is in a very different position.91
It appears that if control has not been transferred,
minorities cannot jump onto the litigation bandwagon
with the sole purpose of seeking compensation for
unforeseeable damages. To aver that minorities should
be entitled to an order of specific performance under
such circumstances is at best fatalistic and at worst illu-
sory.92
The court, thus, rejected the notion that minorities were
entitled to recourse in aborted takeovers even though
the majority may institute a claim for damages, there-
fore, upholding the appeal. The court held that the
whole rationale for the implementation of the
mandatory offer regime is to afford minorities
protection when control of the targeted company has
changed. The judgment, somewhat, sought to draw a
clear line between attempted acquisition and completed
acquisition vis-à-vis the duty to make mandatory offers.
Even though the court premised its decision on contract
law, the decision has not steered clear of criticism.93
5.2 How Has a Firm Intention Announcement
Protocol Enhanced the Law?
The author in this section intends to evaluate how the
current rules affected the aforementioned position and
to analyse the extent of damages an offeror must bear in
failed acquisitions. It must be averred that rule 4.2.4 of
the Code affected aborted acquisitions in that it
advanced the implementation of the cautionary and firm
intention announcements. As already specified, the
author does not intend to extract much currency from
the law archives regarding transformation of the take-
over rules. The author mainly seeks to deal with the
prevailing takeover rules.
The author shall first bring into focus the consequences
of the breach of cautionary announcement in terms of
the takeover rules and the possible legal recourse arising
therefrom. The mentioning of this rule is important
because the cautionary announcement forms an integral
part of takeovers and, in some cases, precedes a firm
intention announcement. There is no specific time that
a cautionary announcement should be made, but if the
need arises, it should be made when there is suspicion
that sensitive information could be leaked. The making
of the cautionary announcement depends on the nature
of the securities and their volatility to certain infor-
mation.94 Immediately after the parties (offeror or offer-
ee) gain knowledge of any price-sensitive information
and the necessary degree of confidentiality of such
91. Ibid., Para. 10.
92. Ibid., Para. 11.
93. See S. Luiz, ‘Mandatory offers’, 12 South African Mercantile Law Jour-
nal 382, at 388-93 (2000): according to Luiz the court should have nar-
rowed the matter to whether an acquisition of securities transpired. This
approach, it is argued, would provide certainty for the market and pro-
vides the minority shareholders the right to legal recourse. Thus, Luiz
believes the making of a mandatory offer is not premised on the theory
of change of company control.
94. See Section 3.4 of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Listings
Requirements.
information cannot be maintained, or if the company
offeree suspects that confidentiality has or may have
been breached, the offeree company must publish a cau-
tionary announcement.95 The announcement is aimed at
warning the parties involved in a takeover to exercise
caution when dealing with securities or sensitive infor-
mation and to pronounce that the offeree company is
subject to a takeover bid.96 Although the making of a
cautionary announcement does not necessarily result in
a contractual bond between the offeror and the offeree,97
it serves the purpose of protecting security holders
through abating the depreciation of the offeree compa-
ny’s securities. The cautionary announcement aids in
ensuring that price-sensitive information is not careless-
ly leaked to the market,98 and if there is a leak, the
announcement is intended to cushion the effect of the
leak.99 The obligation to ensure that price-sensitive
information is treated with caution rests with both the
offeror and the offerees; failure to practice due care
could result in the guilty party being liable for delictual
damages.100
Conversely, the making of a firm intentions announce-
ment leads to contractual liability.101 A firm intention
announcement must be made when a mandatory offer is
required or when an offeror has transmitted a firm
intention to make an offer and is ready, able and willing
to proceed with the offer.102 It must be emphasised that
only when the procedures are adhered to could a firm
intention announcement be made. This would involve
the offeror approaching the board with sufficient merit
to implement the offer in full,103 in addition to convinc-
ing the independent board that the offer will be ful-
filled.104 All material facts concerning price-sensitive
information must be kept confidential before a firm
intention announcement.105 When a firm intention
announcement has been implemented, the offeror must
proceed with the offer; in consequence, the offer cannot
be withdrawn without the consent of the offerees.106
Where the offeror breaches its obligation to the offerees
after the implementation of the firm intention
95. Section 3.9 of the JSE Listings Requirements.
96. Section 11.40 of the JSE Listings Requirements.
97. Rule 94(2) of the Companies Regulation 2011.
98. Rule 95(2) of the Companies Regulation 2011.
99. Rule 95(7) and (8) of the Companies Regulation 2011.
100. For the test to determine whether a party has acted negligently, see
Lomagundi Sheetmetal & Engineering (Pty) Ltd v. Basson 1973 (4) SA
523 (RA) and Gordon v. Da Mata 1969 (3) SA 285 (A). Of course,
wrongfulness an element which is best expressed in the theory of legal
conviction of the community, will have to be established as well, see
Schultz v. Butt 1986 (3) SA 667 (A) 679; SM Goldstein & Co (Pty) Ltd
v. Cathkin Park Hotel (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 1019 (SCA) 1024 and
Minister van Polisie v. Ewels 1975 (3) 590(A), at 596H-597G.
101. See P. Nkoane, ‘How are offers for Minority Securities Enforced in
Corporate law?’, 3(2) Journal of Corporate and Commercial Law &
Practice 52, at 66-8 (2017).
102. Rule 101(1) of the Companies Regulation 2011.
103. Rule 99(1), (3) and (4) of the Companies Regulation 2011.
104. Rule 95(4) of the Companies Regulation 2011.
105. Rule 95(2) of the Companies Regulation 2011.
106. Rule 101(1) of the Companies Regulation 2011.
48
ELR September 2020 | No. 2 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000169
announcement, offerees could find remedies either in
delict or contract law.107
A solicitation campaign may ensue any time after a firm
intention announcement.108 The function of the solicita-
tion campaign is basically to, first, communicate the
terms of an offer to the relevant security holders; sec-
ond, determine which of the security holders accepts the
offer; and finally, conduct a ballot in respect of the offer.
In cases where specific security holders have been
approached by the offeror, and the offeror has tendered
to acquire their securities, a solicitation campaign would
be directed at minorities who seek to depart the compa-
ny. In this instance, the solicitation campaign may be
conducted before or after the initial acquisition.109 Once
the solicitation campaign is completed and the offer is
accepted, a full contract between the offeror and the
offerees comes to life. It is quite overt that the firm
intention announcement protocol has aided the task of
determining when the offeror should bear the obligation
to undertake its takeover vows.
6 The Effect of the Firm
Intention Announcement
and the Leverage of
Minority Shareholders
In this section, the author sets out to canvass cases of
breach of takeover rules in the context of mandatory
offers. It is possible that the offeror or the offeree, or
even both, could be held responsible for failed acquisi-
tions. It must be understood that a firm intention
announcement precedes the solicitation campaign. After
a firm intention announcement is published, the offeror
bears the obligation for reparation where its deportment
is in breach of the takeover rules – where the offer
would have been accepted. This kind of infractions are
discussed first. However, it is similarly possible that the
offeree could reject the offer or fail to counter-perform
timely, resulting in a breach of contract and subsequent
rescission of the contract. In this instance, the question
is, will minorities have recourse if they have accepted
the offer and are willing to offer counter-performance?
The author intends to analyse these infractions and to
provide an opinion on the merit of the argument that
none of the parties bear any responsibility towards
minorities.
107. See note 10 and 100 above. Also see D. Hutchison and C.J. Pretorius
(eds.), The Law of Contract in South Africa, 2nd ed. Oxford and Cape
Town (2012 ), at 133: ‘if the breach occurs due false statements been
made, the innocent party will surely sue in contract, and if it was made
fraudulently or even negligently, he or she is most likely to sue in delict,
since he or she will then be able to recover consequential losses as well’.
108. Rule 93 of the Companies Regulation 2011.
109. Subsection 123(3) and (4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.
6.1 Where the Offeror Breaches the Takeover
Rules
The offeror could surely fail to perform all its takeover
undertakings. There are two kinds of takeover infrac-
tions that must be separated in respect of takeover rules.
First, the author discusses situations where the offeror
fails to acquire all the offerees’ securities, and second,
situations where the offeror fails to acquire minority
securities only.
In situations where the offeror withdraws from the
negotiations before a firm intention announcement is
made, no offeree attains legal standing to sue, except in
the clearest of cases. This could be the case where the
offeror has concluded a contract with the offeree before
an attempt to make a firm intention announcement. In
any event, this sort of indenture may be voidable
because it may amount to a major breach of the takeover
rules.110 If the offeror has proceeded with negotiations
to a point where a firm intention announcement is
made, thereupon the offeror undertakes legal liability.
The making of a firm intention announcement concomi-
tantly creates a quasi- or phantom contract between the
offeror and would-be offerees. This formation is
referred to as a quasi- or phantom contract because
before the offerees accept the offer, the only person who
is bound by the contract is the offeror, and the offeror
cannot rescind the contract without assuming a legal
burden.111
Where the offeror fails to honour the takeover rules
after the making of a firm intention announcement, the
offeror assumes the responsibility to repair the damage
that is caused by its breach. The Panel, in terms of the
companies’ regulations, is granted the power to exercise
bank guarantees made during the offer to satisfy the
purchase.112 Equally, it is possible that the Panel may be
unable to access the funds to satisfy the offeror’s per-
formance. It must be marked that the regulations
empower the Panel to act on behalf of security holders
when the offeror neglects to pay and not when the offer-
or refuses to pay and intends to rescind the agreement. It
must be kept in mind that the mandate rule in banking
law protects the account holder against unauthorised
transactions. Thus, when the account holder has intima-
ted to the bank that certain transaction should not or
should be executed, the bank should submit to the
request.113 In cases of refusal to continue with the offer,
judicial intervention should be pursued. The high court
has jurisdiction to grant relief in such cases.
In an effort to enforce compliance with the takeover
rules, the court can order the offeror to acquire the
targeted securities in addition to minority securities.114
The court can sanction an order of specific perform-
ance.115 However, the court is not constrained to sanc-
110. Section 127 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.
111. See Nkoane (2017), above n. 101, at 68.
112. Rule 111(4) and (5) of the Companies Regulation 2011.
113. Nedbank v. Pestana 2009 (2) SA 189 (SCA).
114. Benson v. SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A).
115. See Badenhorst v. Theophanous 1988 (1) SA 793 (C); Oliver v. Stoop
(1978) 1 SA 196 (T); Carpet Contractors (Pty) Ltd v. Grobler 1975 (2)
49
Paul Nkoane doi: 10.5553/ELR.000169 - ELR September 2020 | No. 2
tion an order of specific performance – the granting is
subject to judicial discretion.116 Where the court
declines to grant an order of specific performance or
where the holders of the targeted securities117 have elec-
ted to seek damages, the right extended to minorities to
seek an order of specific performance automatically
expires. This is so because minorities would no longer
be exposed to the peril that comes with the alteration of
the company’s control.118 Therefore, minorities should
embark on the route that leads to the destination of con-
tractual damages. This means that the offeror would
only be liable to pay for damages flowing from its breach
of contract.119 In consequence, minorities cannot
demand an order of specific performance as framed by
Cameron J in Sefalana.120 It is doubtful whether it is
historically, economically and, therefore, legally accept-
able to approve Cameron’s construction. It would be
legally and commercially problematic to insist that the
offeror who failed to attain control of a target company
should subsequently be forced to be a minority security
holder of the same. This, in my estimation, does not
symbolise fair and equal treatment of all affected
security holders.
The scenario changes quite dramatically where the court
has enforced specific performance for acquisition of the
targeted securities. In this situation, two legal remedies
become available to minorities: specific performance and
damages. It is entirely in the discretion of the minorities
which remedy they may invoke.
Where the offeror has completed a purchase of the
targeted securities, minorities by design gain the right to
specific performance. If the offeror has failed to extend
an offer to minorities, by virtue of implementing a firm
intention announcement the offeror would have assen-
ted to an agreement with the minorities that entitles
them to an order of specific performance. This is so
because of the change of control in the offeree compa-
ny.121 Where control of the company has changed, it is
accurate to argue that minorities should receive the
same treatment as the outgoing shareholders. The
minorities should be shielded from the abuse corporate
bullies or company looters may inflict on them during
or after takeovers.122 Where specific performance is
SA 436 (T); Farmers’ Co-op Society (Reg) v. Berry 1912 AD 343 and Ex
Parte Neethling 1951 (4) SA 331 (AD).
116. Benson v. Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A), at 782-3
and Ex Parte Neethling 1951 (4) SA 331 (AD), at 335.
117. By the term targeted securities, the author implies securities that the
offeror initially sought, this excludes minority securities
118. Sefalana Employee Benefits Organisation v. Haslam 2000 (2) SA 415
(SCA), Para. 7.
119. S. Van der Merwe et al., Contract General Principles, 4th ed., Cape
Town: Juta (2012), at 357.
120. See Haslam v. Sefalana Employee Benefits Organisation [1997] 4 All
SA 269 (W), at 276-9.
121. Sefalana Employee Benefits Organisation v. Haslam 2000 (2) SA 415
(SCA), Para. 4. ‘It is only when the stage is reached at which an intend-
ed or proposed transaction will, if consummated, result in a change of
control within the meaning of the Code that the hand of the panel is
laid upon the transaction’.
122. See Spinnaker Investments (Pty) Ltd v. Tongaat Group Ltd 1982 (1) SA
65 (A), at 71.
sought for the enforcement of the agreement, as previ-
ously averred, the granting of that order will depend on
the discretion of the court.123 In light of what the take-
over machinery is aimed to achieve, the court intending
to secure minority protection may grant the order of
specific performance, unless the order creates an injus-
tice.124 Even so, the minorities are afforded the liberty to
select the redress in the form of specific performance or
the suit of damages. Where it is clear that the granting
of an order of specific performance may result in the
offeror suffering financial hardship and cannot be rec-
onciled with the circumstances at hand, and that the
transaction will not put minorities at risk, the court may
award damages instead of specific performance.125 Even
though, the change of control may have occurred, the
transformation of the company must not result in the
mistreatment of minorities. Where the mistreatment of
minorities is improbable, the court may award damages
in lieu of an order of specific performance. This leads to
the question of whether minorities will receive equal
treatment as their securities will not be acquired.
6.2 Where the Offeree Breaches Contract Law
Rules or Rejects the Offer
The situation where the offerees reject or breach the
agreement for acquisition of their securities poses obvi-
ous difficulties. A firm intention announcement creates
a phantom or quasi-contract binding the offeror alone.
Thus, the offeror attains no standing to sue where its
offer is rejected. Only when its offer is accepted, firmly
bringing a contract into existence, and later repudiated,
the offeror will have locus standi. The author elucidates
this situation in a contract law matrix.
The solicitation campaign facilitates the purpose of
transmitting an offer to the offerees, and only when the
offerees accept the offer will a full contract be constitu-
ted.126 The offer on its own does not perfect a contract –
only acceptance of a valid offer does.127 Thus, the offer
lapses or perishes if it is rejected. This means that if the
offeree makes a counteroffer, the offeree rejects the
offer. The rejection of the offer releases the offeror from
the obligation created by the firm intention announce-
ment. The question then is, if minorities would have
assented to a contract which the majority offeree reject-
ed or repudiated, or both the offeror and the majority
offeree mutually agreed to terminate, will minorities be
afforded recourse?
It has become clearer by now that a firm intention
announcement creates a legal promise to the offerees
(i.e. majority offeree and minority offeree). The emer-
123. Benson v. Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A), at
782-3; Ex Parte Neethling 1951 (4) SA 331 (AD), at 335 and Carpet
Contractors (Pty) Ltd v. Grobler 1975 (2) SA 436 (T), at 441.
124. Benson v. Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A), at
782-3.
125. Farmers Co-operative Society (Reg) v. Berry 1912 AD 319, at 324 and
Ras v. Simpson 1904 TS 254, at 256.
126. Bird v. Sumerville 1961 (3) SA 194 (A); McKenzie v. Farmers Coopera-
tive Meat Industries Ltd 1922 AD 16 and Godfrey v. Paruk 1965 (2) SA
738 (D).
127. Efroiken v. Simon 1921 CPD 367.
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gence of this agreement gives one the impression that
minorities would have recourse if the phantom or per-
fected agreement is breached by the principal offerees,
but the author believes otherwise.
The offer must be unconditionally accepted before a
binding agreement is created; a conditional acceptance
amounts to a counteroffer.128 The offeror would often
approach the offeree company with the ambition of
acquiring a certain number of securities, in addition to
those imposed by statutory law, that is, mandatory
offers, and would make an offer to that effect. The
majority acceptance of the offer will constitute a full
contract, as mandatory offer is an auxiliary or a secon-
dary offer. Where only minorities accept the offer and
the majority offerees reject it, the acceptance becomes
conditional and equivocal, and no valid contract comes
to life.129 This is because an offer must be accepted in
full and at the terms set out in the offer.130 Similarly,
when the majority offerees repudiate the contract, the
supervening impossibility to carry out the agreement
arises for minorities.131 This in actual fact makes the
contract between the offeror and the minorities impossi-
ble. Consequently, do minorities have any recourse?
It could perhaps be submitted that minorities could seek
redress by suing the majority for damages, if the majori-
ties were responsible for the cancellation of the agree-
ment.132 Nevertheless, it is explicit that minorities can-
not seek reparation from the majority holders. This is
because there is no indenture, whether actual or osten-
sive, between the minorities and the majority. In truth, a
firm intention announcement creates a bond, binding
only the offeror to fulfil a promise to the offerees, and
not between the offerees themselves. By the same token,
it could be argued that owing to the bond created
between the offeror and offerees, minorities could aver
that, as the offeror was aware of the fact that the solicita-
tion campaign does not guarantee acceptance of the
offer by all securities holders, it stands to reason that
those who accept the offer should be afforded recourse.
This sort of argument would prove futile, as minorities
will simply be resisted with the exceptio nonadempleticon-
tractus133 if they invoke an order of specific perform-
ance.134 A defence of the exceptio should be based on the
128. Boerne v. Harris 1949 (1) SA 793 (A).
129. Van Jaarsveld v. Ackerman 1975 (2) SA 753 (A). also see rule 81(d) of
the Companies Regulations of 2011.
130. Laws v. Rutherford 1924 AD 261.
131. Kudu Granite Operations (Pty) Ltd v. Caterna Ltd 2003 (5) SA 193
(SCA) and Peters Flamman & Co v. Kokstad Municipality 1919 (AD)
427.
132. The lawsuit could occur because a repudiation of the contract could
deny minorities to claim the premium offered for their securities or the
price of their securities depreciates due to the termination of the con-
tract.
133. The exceptio non adempleti contractus as a defence is restricted to
reciprocal contracts where both parties are to perform simultaneously or
where it is required that one party performs before the other. Thus,
where a party fails to perform satisfactorily, the defendant can ward off
a claim with this principle.
134. Grand Mines (Pty) Ltd v. Giddey NO [1998] JOL 4146 (A); Kamaludin
v. Gihwala 1956 (2) SA 323 (C) and BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v. Scope
Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A).
terms of the purported agreement, that is, since the
offeror contracted to acquire a certain number of securi-
ties, for the offeree to enforce the contract, the offeree
must first render full performance (i.e. the minorities
must deliver the amount of securities the offeror ten-
dered to purchase in its offer). This, in fact, would
amount to an impossibility that renders the purported
contract between the minorities and the offeror void.135
Where the majority offeree rejects the offer or repudi-
ates the contract, minorities will not have a right to legal
recourse. This sort of consequence, in my opinion, does
not support the theory of equal treatment during
acquisitions.
In cases where the offeror and the majority offerees have
mutually agreed to terminate the concluded agreement,
minorities may have a legitimate case for damages
against the offeror, since the offeror would have been
mindful that its action might disenfranchise the minori-
ties.136 That said, the measure of liability would very
much hinge on other factors,137 for instance, if undue
hardship has compelled mutual cancellation, then the
prospect of the court awarding damages to the minori-
ties becomes slim.
7 The Technique to Balance
the Equities and Remedies to
Liberate the Situation
The takeover rules are intended to protect security
holders; even so, there is no guarantee that minorities
may receive equal treatment. The question, thus, arises
whether mandatory offers merely make takeovers
expensive without guaranteeing equal treatment for all
security holders.138 This is so because the firm intention
announcement precedes the solicitation campaign139–
the offeror will then have to approach the offeree com-
pany with the ambition to acquire all its voting share
stock. The mere fact that a party makes an offer that
culminates in an affected transaction means that the
party must be able and willing to implement mandatory
135. Wilson v. Smith 1956 (1) SA 393 (W).
136. For instance, the offeror and majority offerees may reach a compromise
which extinguishes a contract.
137. Administrator, Natal v. Edouard 1990 (3) SA 581 (A) 597. In an obiter
dictum, the court ventured into the issue of fault and contractual
damages. The court averred that fault is not a central factor in whether
damages ought to be awarded where the contract is terminated. How-
ever, it must be argued that where fault created the resultant damage,
the guilty party must bear the obligation for reparation similar to what
would happen in cases of delict. The court would then have to deter-
mine whether the breach has resulted in a contractual damage or a
delictual damage. If it is found that the damage could be established on
delict, thereupon the court must measure the degree of damages suf-
fered.
138. M.P. Larkin and J. Boltar, ‘Company Law (Including Close-Corpora-
tion)’, Annual Survey of South African Law 403, at 431 (1997) and J.R.
Wiblin ‘Mandatory Takeover Offer – Too High a Price for the Economy
to Pay?’, 29(3) Journal for Juridical Science 173-85 (2004).
139. See Section 5.2.
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offers.140 It is submitted that ‘no person may enter into
an affected transaction unless that person is ready, able
and willing to implement that transaction’; moreover,
‘no person must make an offer unless that person is
ready, able and willing to proceed with the offer’.141 As
illustrated earlier, offerors may not even make offers or
fulfil offers for minorities’ securities – the Sefalana case
affirms this truth.142 Minorities may believe that their
securities will be bought when a firm intention
announcement is made, but it has been made clear that
minorities may not receive equal treatment where the
court cannot compel the offeror to acquire minority
securities.
To moderate the aforementioned problems, the proce-
dures of takeovers should be altered. It is fair to argue
that a party should affirm its intention to acquire securi-
ties only when the party is aware of the number of
security holders who are willing to sell. This implies
that a party should only make a firm intention
announcement when the party knows the degree of lia-
bility involved. It is, therefore, suggested that the solici-
tation campaign should precede a firm intention
announcement. The offerees ought to be informed that
a solicitation campaign does not inevitably mean that an
offeror will be compelled to proceed with an offer. This
is because, if those who accept the offer are a few, then
their acceptance will amount to a counteroffer, which
may be accepted or rejected.
It is rather difficult to understand why the firm inten-
tion announcement should succeed the solicitation cam-
paign. The offerees could either accept the offer or
reject it when approached. Perhaps the rationale is that,
to secure market credibility and stability, security hold-
ers should only be approached when the offeror is able
and willing.143 But whether the offeror is able and will-
ing to fulfil the offer is a matter that has to be deter-
mined during negotiations.144 Similarly, an enquiry into
which offeree is willing to sell should not be interpreted
as meaning that an obvious sale is in the offing.
In appropriate cases, companies should annually collect
data indicating which of the minority security holders
will sell if an offer triggers a mandatory offer. Thus,
140. P. Delport et al., Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008
(2014), at 431-3.
141. Section 119 (2)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and rule 101 of the
Companies Regulations 2011.
142. Haslam v. Sefalana Employee Benefits Organisation [1997] 4 All SA
269 (W).
143. It could be argued that the securities price could be easily manipulated
or fluctuate through the making of offers before the firm intention
announcement, which would push the price of securities up. Market
dynamism dictates that when supply exceeds demand, the price of the
commodity would drop, and when demand exceeds supply, the price
would rise. However, before the solicitation campaign is conducted, the
information must be kept confidential. Thus, the solicitation campaign
would involve the market price of securities at that juncture. The mak-
ing of a cautionary announcement should guarantee that sensitive
information is kept confidential. This should keep the prices stable, and
the matter of the payment of premiums on the purchase price should
be a matter between the offeror and offerees. It is trite that any price-
sensitive information should remain confidential throughout the period
of acquisition. This should benefit the offeror and the offerees.
144. Rule 99(1) and (3) of the Companies Regulation 2011.
when a majority shareholder is approached for the
acquisition of its securities, the number of minorities
who intend to sell is readily available. The company, in
collecting this data, must point out to the security hold-
ers that only those who have specified the need to sell
will be given first preference when offers are made.145
Thus, minorities can exercise their right to sell prior to
bids, and upon submissions of bids, the minority share-
holders have an option to sell or not to sell. This infor-
mation will be important in communicating adequate
information to the offeror, specifying the merit of the
offer and the purchase price, including the mandatory
offer price. Therefore, a firm intention announcement
should be made based on that information. When offers
include minority securities, equal treatment of all
security holders is automatically guaranteed.
8 Conclusion
In many takeover regimes around the world, the issue of
equal treatment may be regarded as important; never-
theless, a proper analysis may expose gaps in the equal
treatment theory. Takeover regimes in the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom seem to be focused on the
main offer; however, there is no doubt that the regimes
contain mandatory offer rules to promote protection for
minorities. Whether the regimes are fully entrenched
with rules that compel equal treatment of all sharehold-
ers in all cases leaves much doubt. In some cases, the
minorities must approach the court before they can
enjoy the same treatment as the majority, and surely the
minorities may fail to enforce equal treatment. The
British and the Dutch systems, compared with the
South African system, appear to marginalise minorities;
in the latter system much was done to promote equal
treatment, but that much seems not to be enough. Equal-
ity, like justice, is time sensitive: equality delayed is
equality denied.
The disparity in the courts’ decisions in takeover mat-
ters has led South African lawmakers to revise takeover
procedures. The enactment of the firm intention
announcement rule has moderated the initial glaring
leak in the takeover boat and provides direct remedies to
minorities in takeovers. This article has demonstrated
that a firm intention announcement, to some extent,
warrants equal and fair treatment of affected security
holders. When a firm intention announcement is made,
the offeror is compelled to fulfil its takeover vows. This
clearly affirms the principle of equal treatment in take-
overs. Even so, the article has illustrated that the leak is
not completely sealed. The principle of equal treatment
in some cases is a mere fallacy, and the procedures cur-
rently adopted represent a deterrence rather than a
measure of protection for minorities. It has been argued
elsewhere that clearer and stricter takeover rules benefit
145. Some shareholder regard their shareholding as a long-term investment
and may not be enticed to sell any time sooner.
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security holders, particularly minority security hold-
ers.146
With the proposed amendments, the rules will be clear-
er, and the cost of acquisition could be ascertained after
the solicitation campaign. It could be argued that this
could present an opportunity for looters. The author
believes that should not be the case. It is the duty of the
board to probe the merit of the offer, in tandem examin-
ing the intentions of the offeror, before conducting a
solicitation campaign. And, if the need arises, the infor-
mation gathered should be filed in the company’s mem-
orandum of association, where it may be invoked if the
offeror intends to act contrary to its prior assertions.
Moreover, the fundamental transactions rules should
prove enough in derailing possible looters.147
146. Y. Wang and H. Lahr, ‘Takeover Law to Protect Shareholders:
Increasing Efficiency or Merely Redistributing Gains?’, 43 Journal of
Corporate Finance 288, at 311 (2017).
147. See chap 5 part A of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.
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